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Abstract 
This thesis presents a comprehensive study of 136 system failures attributed to network-
partitioning faults from 25 widely used distributed systems. The majority of the failures led to 
catastrophic effects, such as data loss, reappearance of deleted data, broken locks, and system 
crashes. The majority of the failures can easily manifest once a network partition occurs: They 
require little to no client input, can be triggered by isolating a single node, and are 
deterministic. However, the number of test cases that one must consider is extremely large. 
Fortunately, this work identifies ordering, timing, and network fault characteristics that 
considerably simplify testing. Furthermore, majority of the failures are due to design flaws in 
core system mechanisms. 
The results of the study indicate that the majority of the studied failures could have been 
avoided by design reviews, and could have been discovered by testing with network-
partitioning fault injection. We built NEAT, a testing framework that simplifies the 
coordination of multiple clients and can inject different types of network-partitioning faults.  
NEAT was used to test seven popular systems and 32 failures were found and reported. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
With the increased dependency on cloud systems [1, 2, 3, 4], users expect high—ideally, 
24/7—service availability and data durability [5, 6]. Hence, cloud systems are designed to be 
highly available [7, 8, 9] and to preserve data stored in them despite failures of devices, 
machines, networks, or even entire data centers [10, 11, 12]. 
The goal of the study is to better understand the impact of a specific type of infrastructure 
fault on modern distributed systems: network-partitioning faults. Moreover, the aim is to 
understand the specific sequence of events that lead to user-visible system failures and to 
characterize these system failures to identify opportunities for improving system fault 
tolerance.  
This study focuses on network partitioning for two reasons. The first is due to the complexity 
of tolerating these faults [13, 14, 15, 16]. Network-partitioning fault tolerance pervades the 
design of all system layers, from the communication middleware and data replication [13, 14, 
16, 17] to user API definition and semantics [18, 19], and it dictates the availability and 
consistency levels a system can achieve [20]. Second, recent studies [21, 22, 23, 24] indicate 
that, in production networks, network-partitioning faults occur as frequently as once a week 
and take from tens of minutes to hours to repair. 
Given that network-partitioning fault tolerance is a well-studied problem [13, 14, 17, 20], 
this raises questions about how these faults sill lead to system failures. What is the impact of 
these failures? What are the characteristics of the sequence of events that lead to a system 
failure? What are the characteristics of the network-partitioning faults? And, foremost, how 
can we improve system resilience to these faults?  
To help answer these questions, a thorough study of 136 network-partitioning failures from 
25 widely used distributed systems was conducted. The selected systems are popular and 
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diverse, including key-value systems and databases (MongoDB, VoltDB, Redis, Riak, 
RethinkDB, HBase, Aerospike, Cassandra, Geode, Infinispan, and Ignite), file systems (HDFS 
and MooseFS), an object store (Ceph), a coordination service (ZooKeeper), messaging systems 
(Kafka, ActiveMQ, and RabbitMQ), a data-processing framework (Hadoop MapReduce), a 
search engine (Elasticsearch), resource managers (Mesos, Chronos, and DKron), and in-
memory data structures (Hazelcast, Ignite, and Terracotta). 
For each considered failure, the failure report, logs, discussions between users and 
developers, source code, code patch, and unit tests were carefully studied. Also, twenty four 
failures were reproduced manually to understand the specific manifestation sequence of the 
failure. 
Failure impact. Overall, network-partitioning faults lead to silent catastrophic failures (e.g., 
data loss, data corruption, data unavailability, and broken locks), with 21% of the failures 
leaving the system in a lasting erroneous state that persists even after the partition heals.  
Ease of manifestation. Oddly, it is easy for these failures to occur. A majority of the failures 
required three or fewer frequently used events (e.g., read, and write), 88% of them can be 
triggered by isolating a single node, and 62% of them were deterministic. It is surprising that 
catastrophic failures manifest easily, given that these systems are generally developed using 
good software-engineering practices and are subjected to multiple design and code reviews as 
well as thorough testing [5, 25].  
Partial Network Partitions. Another unexpected result is that a number of the failures 
(29%) were caused by an unanticipated type of fault: partial network partitions. Partial 
partitions isolate a set of nodes from some, but not all, nodes in the cluster, leading to a 
confusing system state in which the nodes disagree whether a server is up or down. The effects 
of this disagreement are poorly understood and tested. This is the first study to analyze the 
impact of this fault on modern systems. 
Testability. This work studied the testability of these failures. In particular, it analyzed the 
manifestation sequence of each failure, ordering constraints, timing constraints, and network 
fault characteristics. While the number of event permutations that can lead to a failure is 
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excessively large, it identified characteristics that considerably reduce the number of test cases 
(Chapter 5). Interestingly, the majority of the failures can be reproduced through tests and by 
using only three nodes. 
This work debunk two common presumptions. First, network practitioners presume that 
systems, with their software and data redundancy, are robust enough to tolerate network 
partitioning [22]. Consequently, practitioners assign low priority to the repair of top-of-the-
rack (ToR) switches [22], even though these failures isolate a rack of machines. The findings 
show that this presumption is ill founded, as 88% of the failures can occur by isolating a single 
node. Second, system designers assume that limiting client access to one side of a network 
partition will eliminate the possibility of a failure [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The findings 
indicate that 64% of the failures required no client access at all or client access to only one 
side of the network partition. 
We examined the unit tests that are related to the studied code patches and found that 
developers lack the proper tools to test these failures. In most cases, developers used mocking 
[33, 34] to test the impact of network partitioning on only one component and on just one side 
of the partition. However, this approach is inadequate for end-to-end testing of complete 
distributed protocols. 
The findings of the study motivated us to build the network partitioning testing framework 
(NEAT). NEAT simplifies testing by allowing developers to specify a global order for client 
operations and by providing a simple API for creating and healing partitions as well as crashing 
nodes. NEAT uses OpenFlow [35] to manipulate switch-forwarding rules and create partitions. 
For deployments that do not have an OpenFlow switch, NEAT has a version that uses 
iptables [36] to alter firewall rules at end hosts. 
NEAT was used to test seven systems: Ceph [37], ActiveMQ [38], Apache Ignite [39], 
Terracotta [40], DKron [41], Infinispan [42], and MooseFS [43]. Thirty two failures were 
found and reported. These failures led to data loss, stale reads, reappearance of deleted data, 
unavailability, double locking, and broken locks. 
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a categorization of network-
partitioning faults, discusses the theoretical limit on system design, and discusses the current 
testing techniques. Chapter 3 presents the methodology and its limitations. Then, chapter 4 and 
5 present the findings of the study. NEAT framework is presented in Chapter 6 and additional 
related work is discussed in Chapter  7 . Finally, chapter 8 discusses number of observations and 
conclude. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
This chapter presents the three types of network-partitioning faults (Section 2.1), discusses the 
theoretical limit for systems design (Section 2.2), and surveys the current approaches for 
testing systems’ resilience to network-partitioning faults (Section 2.3). 
2.1 Types of Network Partitions 
Modern networks are complex. They span multiple data centers [44, 45], use heterogeneous 
hardware and software [23], and employ a wide range of middle boxes (e.g., NAT, load 
balancers, route aggregators, and firewalls) [21, 44, 45]. Despite the high redundancy built into 
modern networks, catastrophic failures are common [21, 22, 23, 24]. The following are the 
three types of network-partitioning: 
Complete network partitioning leads to dividing the network into two disconnected parts 
(Figure 1.a). Complete partitions can happen at different scales; for example, they can manifest 
in geo-replicated systems due to the loss of connectivity between data centers. HP reported 
that 11% of its enterprise network failures lead to site connectivity problems [23]. Turner et al. 
found that a network partition occurs almost once every 4 days in the California-wide CENIC 
network [24]. In a data center, a complete partition can manifest due to failures in the core or 
aggregation switches [22] or because of a ToR switch failure. Microsoft and Google report that 
ToR failures are common and have led to 40 network partitions in two years at Google [21] 
and caused 70% of the downtime at Microsoft [22]. Finally, NIC failures [46] or bugs in the 
networking stack can lead to the isolation of a single node that could be hosting multiple VMs. 
Finally, network-partition faults caused by correlated failures of multiple devices are not 
uncommon [22, 24, 44]. Correlated switch failures are frequently caused by system-wide 
upgrades and maintenance tasks [21, 22]. 
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Partial network partitioning is a fault that leads to the division of nodes into three groups 
(Group1, Group2, and Group3 in Figure 1.b) such that two groups (say, Group1 and Group2) 
are disconnected while Group3 can communicate with both Group1 and Group2 (Figure 1.b). 
Partial partitions could manifest due to flaky links, or due to inconsistencies in switch-
forwarding rules. Unfortunately, the studied failures give little detail about what caused a 
network fault. Consequently, a failure is classified as a partial partition failure if the report 
indicates that the system was split similar to Figure 1.b. 
             
(a) 
 
 
 (b) 
 
(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 1. Network partitioning types. (a) Complete partition: The system is split into two 
disconnected groups (b) Partial partition: The partition affects some, but not all, nodes in the 
system. Group 3 in Figure (b) can communicate with the other two groups. (c) Simplex 
partition, in which traffic flows only in one direction. 
 
Simplex network partitioning permits traffic to flow in one direction, but not in the other 
(Figure 1.c). This is the least common failure and can be caused by inconsistent forwarding 
rules or hardware failures (e.g., the Broadcom BCM5709 chipset bug [46]). The impact of this 
failure is mainly manifested in UDP-based protocols. For instance, a simplex network 
partitioning dropped all incoming packets to a primary server while allowing the primary 
server heartbeats to reach the failover server. The system hang as the failover server neither 
detected the failure nor took over [46]. 
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2.2 Theoretical Limit 
The data consistency model defines which values a read operation may return. The strong 
consistency model [47] (a.k.a. sequential consistency) is the easiest to understand and use. 
Strong consistency promises that a read operation will return the most recent successfully 
written value. Unfortunately, providing strong consistency reduces system availability and 
requires complex consistency protocols [13, 14, 17]. Gilbert and Lynch [20] presented a 
theoretical limit on system design. Their theorem, famously known as the CAP theorem, states 
that in the presence of a network partition, designers need to choose between keeping the 
service available and maintaining data consistency.  
To maintain system availability, system designers choose a relaxed consistency model such 
as the read-your-write [11, 18, 19, 48], timeline [19, 48, 49], and eventually consistent [16, 19, 
50, 51] models.  
Modern systems often implement consensus protocols that have not been theoretically 
proven. Eventually consistent systems implement unproven protocols (Hazelcast [27] and 
Redis [30]), and systems that implement proven, strongly consistent protocols (e.g., Paxos [13] 
and Raft [14]) often tweak these protocols in unproven ways [15, 29, 52]. These practices make 
modern systems vulnerable to unforeseen failure scenarios, such as the ones caused by 
different types of network partitions. 
2.3 Testing with Network Partitioning  
A common testing technique for network-partitioning failures is mocking. Mocking 
frameworks (e.g., Mockito [33]) can be used to imitate communication problems. Mocking 
can be employed to test the impact of a failure on a single component, but it is not suitable for 
system-level testing or for testing distributed protocols. A few systems use hacks to emulate a 
network partition; for instance, Mesos’ unit tests emulate a network partition by ignoring test-
specific messages received by the protobuf middleware [53].  
  8 
Another possible testing approach is to use the Jepsen testing framework [54]. Jepsen is 
written in Clojure [55] and is tuned toward random testing. Jepsen testing typically involves 
running an auto-generated testing workload while the tool injects network-partitioning faults. 
Jepsen does not readily support unit testing or all types of network partitioning. 
We built NEAT, a Java-based, system-level testing framework. NEAT has a simple API for 
deploying systems, specifying clients’ workloads, creating and healing partitions, and crashing 
nodes. Unlike Jepsen, NEAT readily supports injecting the three types of network-partitioning 
faults. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Limitations 
This work studied 136 real-world failures in 25 popular distributed systems. A diverse set of 
distributed systems was selected (Table 1), including 10 key-value storage systems and 
databases, a coordination service, two file systems, an object storage system, three message-
queueing systems, a data-processing framework, a search engine, three resource managers, and 
three distributed in-memory caches and data structures. This diverse set of systems was 
selected to understand the wide impact of network-partitioning faults on all categories of 
distributed systems, and because these systems are widely used and are considered production 
quality. 
The studied 136 failures include 88 failures extracted from the publicly accessible issue-
tracking systems, 16 Jepsen reports [54], and 32 failures detected by NEAT framework. The 
majority of the studied tickets contain enough details to understand the failure. These tickets 
document failures that were confirmed by the developers and include discussions between the 
users and the developers, steps to reproduce the failure, outputs and logs, code patch, and 
sometimes unit tests. 
The included 88 failures in the study were selected as follows: First, The search tool of the 
issue-tracking systems was used to identify tickets related to network partitioning. The 
following keywords were used to search: “network partition,” “network failure,” “switch 
failure,” “isolation,” “split-brain,” and “correlated failures.” Second, the tickets were filtered 
to include those that were dated 2011 or later. Third, low-priority tickets that were marked as 
“Minor” or “Trivial” were excluded. Fourth, the tickets were examined to verify that they 
indeed related to network-partitioning failures and to exclude tickets that appear to be part of 
the development cycle; for instance, they discuss a feature design. Finally, some failures that 
are triggered by a node crash can also be triggered by a network partition isolating that node. 
The study excluded failures that can be triggered by a node crash and studied failures that can 
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only be triggered by a network partition. Out of all Jepsen blog posts (there is 25 in total), 16 
reports were included. These reports are related to this study. Table 1 shows the number of 
failures and the consistency model of the systems included in the study. 
The study examined the failure report, system logs, developers’ and users’ comments, code 
patch, and unit tests of each ticket. NEAT was used to reproduce 13 failures reported in the 
issue-tracking systems, as well as 11 failures reported by Jepsen to understand their intricate 
details. 
Limitations: As with any characterization study, there is a risk that the findings may not be 
generalizable. The following is a list of three potential sources of bias and what was done to 
address them. 
1. Representativeness of the selected systems. Because only 25 systems were studied, the 
results may not be generalizable to the hundreds of systems that are not included in the 
study. However, a diverse set of systems was selected (Table 1). These systems follow 
diverse designs, from persistent storage and reliable in-memory storage to volatile 
caching systems. They use leader-follower or peer-to-peer architectures; are written in 
Java, C, Scala, or Erlang; adopt strong or eventual consistency; use synchronous or 
asynchronous replication; and use chain or parallel replication. The selected systems 
are mature; they have been in development for at least 3 years. These systems are 
widely used: ZooKeeper is a popular coordination service; Kafka is the most popular 
message-queueing system; MapReduce, HDFS, and HBase are the core of the dominant 
Hadoop data analytics platform; MongoDB, Riak, Aerospike, Redis, and VoltDB are 
popular key-value-based databases; and Hazelcast, Ignite, and Terracotta are popular 
tools in a growing area of in-memory distributed data structures. 
2. Sampling bias. The way in which the tickets were chosen may bias the results. We used 
the following terms were used to search for network-partitioning failures: “network 
partition,” “network failure,” “switch failure,” “isolation,” “split-brain,” and 
“correlated failures.” Initially, this list contained a subset of these terms, i.e. “network 
partition” and “network failure.” While, other terms were added to the list gradually 
  11 
whenever we found that they are being used in failure reports to describe network 
partitioning. The study included only high impact tickets. Modern systems take node 
unreachability as an indicator of a node crash. Consequently, a network partition that 
isolates a single node can trigger the same failures that are caused by a single node 
crash. Failures that can be caused by a node crash were excluded and those that are 
solely triggered by a network partitioning fault were considered (i.e., the nodes on both 
sides of the partition must be running for a failure to manifest). Furthermore, all low-
priority tickets were excluded in order to focus on tickets the developers considered 
important. All presented findings should be interpreted with this sampling 
methodology in mind. 
3. Observer error. To minimize the possibility of observer errors, all failures were 
independently reviewed by two team members and discussed in a group meeting before 
agreement was reached, and all team members used the same detailed classification 
methodology. 
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Table 1. List of studied system. The table shows systems’ consistency model, number of 
failures, and number of catastrophic failures. Highlighted rows indicate systems that were 
tested using NEAT, and the number of found failures. 
System 
Consistency 
Model 
Failures 
Total Catastrophic 
MongoDB [29] Strong 19 11 
VoltDB [31] Strong 4 4 
RethinkDB [52] Strong 3 3 
HBase [56] Strong 5 3 
Riak [57] Strong/Eventual 1 1 
Cassandra [58] Strong 4 4 
Aerospike [59] Eventual 3 3 
Geode [60] Strong 2 2 
Redis [30] Eventual 3 2 
Hazelcast [27] Best Effort 7 5 
Elasticsearch [26] Eventual 22 21 
ZooKeeper [61] Strong 3 3 
HDFS [1] Custom 4 2 
Kafka [28] - 5 3 
RabbitMQ [62] - 7 4 
MapReduce [4] - 6 2 
Chronos [63] - 2 1 
Mesos [64] - 4 0 
Infinispan [42] Strong 1 1 
Ignite [39] Strong 15 13 
Terracotta [40] Strong 9 9 
Ceph [37] Strong 2 2 
MooseFS [43] Eventual 2 2 
ActiveMQ [38] - 2 2 
DKron [41] - 1 1 
Total - 136 104 
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Chapter 4 
General Findings 
This chapter presents the general findings from this study. Overall, this study indicates that 
network partitioning leads to catastrophic failures. However, it identifies failure characteristics 
that can improve testing. The findings suggest that most of the studied failures can be 
reproduced using only three nodes and are deterministic or have bounded timing constraints. 
The findings show that core distributed system mechanisms are the most vulnerable, including 
leader election, replication, and request routing. Finally, many of the studied failures are caused 
by partial partitioning faults. 
4.1 Failure Impact 
Overall, the findings indicate that network-partitioning faults cause silent catastrophic failures 
that can result in lasting damage to systems.  
Finding 1. A large percentage (80%) of the studied failures have a catastrophic impact, with 
data loss being the most common (27%) (Table 2). 
Table 2. The impacts of the failures. The percentage of the failures that cause each impact. 
Broken locks include double locking, lock corruption, and failure to unlock. 
Impact %   
 
 
 
Catastrophic 
(79.5%) 
Data loss 26.6% 
Stale read 13.2% 
Broken locks 8.2% 
System crash/hang 8.1% 
Data unavailability 6.6% 
Reappearance of deleted data 6.6% 
Data corruption 5.1% 
Dirty read 5.1% 
Performance degradation 19.1% 
Other 1.4% 
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A failure is classified as catastrophic if it violates the system guarantees or leads to a system 
crash. Table 2 lists the different types of catastrophic failures. Failures that degrade 
performance or crash a single node are not considered catastrophic. Stale reads are catastrophic 
only when the system promises strong consistency. However, they are not considered failures 
in eventually consistent systems. Dirty reads happen when the system returns the value of a 
preceding unsuccessful write operation. For instance, a client reading from the primary replica 
in MongoDB may get a value that is simultaneously being written by a concurrent write 
operation [65]. If the write fails due to network partitioning, the read operation has returned a 
value that was never successfully written (a.k.a. dirty read). 
Compared to other causes of failures, this finding indicates that network partitioning leads 
to a considerable higher percentage of catastrophic failures. Yuan et al. [66] present a study of 
198 randomly selected, high-priority failures from five of the systems which this study 
includes: Cassandra, HBase, HDFS, MapReduce, and Redis. They report that only 24% of 
failures had catastrophic effects3, compared to 80% in the case of network-partitioning failures 
(Table 2). Consequently, developers should carefully consider this fault in all phases of system 
design, development, and testing. 
Finding 2. The majority (90%) of the failures are silent, whereas the rest produce warnings 
that are unatonable. 
The failure reports usually include returned error messages and warnings to the user. The 
majority of the studied failures were silent (i.e., no error or warning was returned to the client), 
with some failures (10%) returning warning messages to the client. Unfortunately, all returned 
warnings were confusing, with no clear mechanism for resolution. For instance, in Riak [67] 
with a strict quorum configuration, when a write fails to fully replicate a new value, the client 
gets a warning indicating that the write operation has updated a subset of replicas, but not all 
of them. This warning is confusing because it does not indicate the necessary action to take 
next. Similarly, MongoDB returns a generic socket exception if a proxy node cannot reach the 
data nodes [68]. This is alarming because users and administrators are not notified when a 
failure occurs, which delays failure discovery, if the failure is discovered at all. 
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Finding 3. Twenty one percent of the failures lead to permanent damage to the system. This 
damage persists even after the network partition heals. 
While 79% of the failures affect the system only while there is a network partition, 21% of 
the failures leave the system in an erroneous state that persists even after the network partition 
heals. For instance, if a new node is unable to reach the other nodes in RabbitMQ [69]  and 
Apache Ignite (section 7.4), the node will assume that the rest of the cluster has failed and will 
form a new independent cluster. These clusters will remain separated, even after the network 
partition heals. 
Overall, as recent studies [21, 22, 23, 24] indicate that network-partitioning faults occur as 
frequently as once a week and take from tens of minutes to hours to repair, it is alarming that 
these faults can lead to silent catastrophic failures. This is surprising, given that these systems 
are designed for deployments in which component failure is the norm. For instance, all of the 
studied systems replicate their data. In MongoDB, Hazelcast, Kafka, Elasticsearch, Geode, 
Mesos, Redis, VoltDB, and RethinkDB, if a leader node is partitioned apart from the majority, 
then the rest of the nodes will quickly elect a new leader. Hazelcast and VoltDB employ “split-
brain protection,” a technique that continuously monitors the network and pauses nodes in the 
minority partition if a network partition is detected. Furthermore, ZooKeeper and MongoDB 
include a mechanism for data consolidation. How, then, do these failures still occur? 
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4.2 Vulnerability of System Mechanisms 
Finding 4. Leader election, configuration change, request routing, and data consolidation 
are the most vulnerable mechanisms to network partitioning (Table 3). 
Table 3. The percentage of the failures involving each system mechanism. Some failures 
involve multiple mechanisms. 
Mechanism % 
Leader election 39.7% 
Configuration change 
 Adding a node  
 Removing a node 
 Membership management 
 Other 
 
10.3% 
3.7% 
3.7% 
2.2% 
19.9% 
Data consolidation 14.0% 
Request routing 13.2% 
Replication protocol 12.5% 
Reconfiguration due to a network partition  11.8% 
Scheduling 2.9% 
Data migration 3.7% 
System integration 1.5% 
 
Leader election is the most vulnerable to network partitioning (was affected by 40% of the 
failures). Further analysis of leader election failures (Table 4) indicated that the most common 
leader election flaw is the simultaneous presence of two leaders. This failure typically 
manifests as follows: A network partition isolates the current leader from the majority of 
replicas. The majority partition elects a new leader. The old leader may eventually detect that 
it no longer has a majority of replicas at its side and step down. However, there is a period of 
time in which each network partition has a leader. The overlap between the two leaders may 
last until the network partition heals (which may take hours [21]). Figure 2 shows how this 
leads to a dirty read failure in VoltDB [70]. When a complete partition isolates the master in 
the minority side, nodes on the majority side start leader election protocol and elect a new 
master (Figure 2 Step 1). If the old master receives a write operation, it will update its local 
copy but it will fail to replicate the operation to other replica and the write operation fails 
(Figure 2 Step 2). Finally, when the old master receives a read operation, it will reply from its 
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local copy and return a value that was not successfully written to the system. MongoDB [71] 
and Raft-based RethinkDB [72] have similar failure. 
Table 4. Leader election flaws 
Leader election failure % 
Overlapping between successive leaders 57.4% 
Electing bad leaders 20.4% 
Voting for two candidates 18.5% 
Conflicting election criteria 3.7% 
 
 
Figure 2. Dirty read failure in VoltDB. (1) Complete network partitions splits the master (old 
master in the figure) from other replicas. After a timeout, nodes on the majority side elects a 
new master. (2) When the old master receives a write request, it will update its local copy, but 
the replication operation will fail and the write request will fail. (3) After that the old master 
receives a read request for the same key, it will reply from its local copy and return the 
uncommitted data.   
 
In all of the studied systems, the leader trusts that its data set or log is complete and all 
replicas should update/trim their data sets to match the leader copy. Consequently, it is critical 
to elect the leader with a complete and consistent data set. Table 4 shows that 20% of leader 
election failures are caused by electing a bad leader. This is caused by using simple criteria for 
leader election, such as the node with the longest log wins (e.g., VoltDB), the node that has the 
latest operation timestamp wins (e.g., MongoDB), or the node with the lowest id wins (e.g., 
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Elasticsearch). These criteria can cause data loss when a node from the minority partition 
becomes a leader and erases all updates performed by the majority partition. 
Conflicting election criteria lead to 3.7% of the leader election failures and are only reported 
in MongoDB. MongoDB leader election has multiple criteria for electing a leader. One can 
assign a priority for a replica to become a leader. The priority node will reject any leader 
proposal; similarly, the node with the latest operation timestamp will reject all leader proposals, 
leaving the cluster without a leader [73]. 
The second most affected mechanism is configuration change, including node join or leave 
and role changes (e.g., changing the primary replica). Section 4.4 discusses two examples of 
these failures. 
The third most affected mechanism is data consolidation. Failures in this mechanism 
typically lead to data loss in both eventually and strongly consistent systems. For instance, 
Redis, MongoDB, Aerospike, Elasticsearch, and Hazelcast employ simple policies to automate 
data consolidation, such as the write with the latest timestamp wins and the log with the most 
entries wins. However, because these policies do not check the replication or operation status, 
they can lose data that is replicated on the majority of nodes and that was acknowledged to the 
client. 
The three ZooKeeper failures are related to data consolidation. For instance, ZooKeeper has 
two mechanisms for synchronizing data between nodes: storage synchronization that is used 
for syncing a large amount of data, and in-memory log synchronization that is used for a small 
amount of data. If node A misses many updates during a network partition, then ZooKeeper 
will use storage synchronization to bring node A up to date. Unfortunately, storage 
synchronization does not update the in-memory log. If A becomes a leader, and other nodes 
use in-memory log synchronization, then A will replicate its incomplete in-memory log [74]. 
Request routing represents the mechanism for routing requests or responses between clients 
and the specific nodes that can serve the request. Failures in request routing represent 13.2% 
of the failures. The majority of those failures are caused by failing to return a response. For 
instance, in Elasticsearch, if a replica (other than the primary) receives write requests, it acts 
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as a coordinator and forwards the requests to the primary replica. If a primary completes the 
write operation but fails to send an acknowledgment back to the coordinator, then the 
coordinator will assume the operation has failed and will return an error code to the client. The 
next client read will return the value written by a write operation that was reported to have 
failed. Moreover, if the client repeats the operation, then it will be executed twice [75]. 
The rest of the failures were caused by flaws in the replication protocol, scheduling, data 
migration mechanism, system integration with ZooKeeper, and system reconfiguration in 
response to network partitioning failures, in which the nodes remove the unreachable nodes 
from their replica set. 
These findings are surprising because 15 of the systems use majority voting for leader 
election to tolerate exactly this kind of failure. Similarly, the primary purpose of a data 
consolidation mechanism is to correctly resolve conflicting versions of data. To improve 
resilience, this finding indicates that developers should enforce tests and design reviews 
focusing on network-partitioning fault tolerance, especially on these mechanisms. 
4.3 Network Faults Analysis 
Finding 5. The majority (64%) of the failures either do not require any client access or 
require client access to only one side of the network partition (Table 5). 
Table 5. Percentage of the failures that require client access during the network partition 
Client Access % 
No client access necessary 28% 
Client access to one side only 36% 
Client access to both sides 36% 
 
This finding debunks a common presumption that network partitioning mainly leads to data 
conflicts, due to concurrent writes at both sides of the partition. Consequently, developers 
ensure that clients can only access one side of the partition to eliminate the possibility of a 
failure [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. As an example of a failure that requires client access to one 
side of the partition, in HBase, region servers process client requests and store them in a log in 
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HDFS. When the log reaches a certain size, a new log is created. If a partial partition separates 
a region server from the HMaster but not from HDFS, then the HMaster will assume that the 
region server has crashed and will assign the region logs to other servers. At this time, if the 
old region server creates a new log, HMaster will not be aware of the new log and will not 
assign it to any region server. All client operations stored in the new log will be lost [76]. 
Section 4.4 discusses a MapReduce failure that does not require any client access. 
This finding indicates that system designers must consider the impact of a network partition 
fault on all system operations, including asynchronous client operations and offline internal 
operations. 
Finding 6. While the majority (69%) of the failures require a complete partition, a 
considerable percentage of them (29%) are caused by partial partitions (Table 6). 
Table 6. Percentage of the failures caused by each type of network-partitioning fault. 
Partition type % 
Complete partition 69.1% 
Partial partition 28.7% 
Simplex partition 2.2% 
 
Partial network partitioning failures are poorly understood and tested, even by expert 
developers. The following section discusses these failures in detail. 
Simplex network partitioning caused 2% of the failures. This type of fault only confuses 
UDP-based protocols and leads to performance degradation. For instance, in HDFS [77], a data 
node that can send a periodic heartbeat message but is unable to receive requests is still 
considered a healthy node.  
The overwhelming majority (99%) of the failures were caused by a single network partition. 
Only 1% of the failures required two network partitions to manifest. 
4.4 Partial Network-Partitioning Failures 
This section presents detailed examples of how partial network-partitioning failures manifest. 
Majority of partial network-partitioning failures are due to design flaws, which indicates that 
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developers do not anticipate networks to fail in this way. Other than that, partial partitions 
failures had impact, ordering, and timing characteristics that are similar to complete partition 
failures. 
Tolerating partial network partitions is complicated because these faults lead to inconsistent 
views of a system state; for instance, nodes disagree on whether a server is up or down. This 
confusion leads part of the system to carry on normal operations, while another part executes 
fault tolerance routines. Apparently, the mix of these two modes is poorly tested. The following 
are four examples: 
 Scheduling in MapReduce and Elasticsearch. Figure 3 shows a data corruption and 
double execution failure in MapReduce. In MapReduce, when the user submits a task 
to the Resource Manager (Figure 3.a Step 1), the Resource Manager starts an 
AppMaster instance (Figure 3.a Step 2) which will create containers (Figure 3.a Step 
3) to execute the user’s task. As shown in Figure 3.b, when a partial network partition 
isolates the AppMaster from the Resource Manager while both can still communicate 
with other nodes in the cluster, the AppMaster will continue executing the task and 
send results to the user, while the Resource Manager will assume that the AppMaster 
has failed and will start a new instance of the AppMaster which will start new 
containers to execute the task again and send results again to the user. This failure will 
confuse the user and will lead to data corruption and double execution [78]. Note that 
in this failure, there is no client access after the network partition. 
Elasticsearch has a similar failure [75] —if a coordinator does not get the result from a 
primary node, the coordinator will run the task again, leading to double execution. 
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(a) The user submits a task to the resource manager. The resource manager starts 
AppMaster instance which will start containers to execute the user’s task. 
 
(b) When the partial network partitions happens between the AppMaster and the 
resource manager, then the resource manager will start another AppMaster on 
another node.  The new AppMaster will start new containers to execute the same 
user’s task which results in double execution.  
 
Figure 3. Double execution failure in MapReduce system. (a) happens before (b) 
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 Data placement in HDFS. If a partial network partition separates a client from, say, 
rack 0, while the NameNode can reach that rack. If the NameNode allocates replicas 
on rack 0, then a client write operation will fail, and the client will ask for a different 
replica. The NameNode, following its rack-aware data placement, will likely suggest 
another node from the same rack. The process repeats five times before the client gives 
up [79]. 
 Leader election in MongoDB and Elasticsearch. MongoDB design includes an arbiter 
process that participates in a leader election to break ties. Assume a MongoDB cluster 
with two replicas (say A and B) and an arbiter, with A being the current leader. Assume 
a partial network partition separates A and B, while the arbiter can reach both nodes. B 
will detect that A is unreachable and will start a leader election process; being the only 
contestant, it will win the leadership. The arbiter will inform A to step down. After 
missing three heartbeats from the current leader (i.e., B), A will assume that B has 
crashed, start the leader election process, and become a leader. The arbiter will inform 
B to step down. This thrashing will continue until the network partition heals [80]. 
MongoDB does not serve client requests during leader election; consequently, this 
failure noticeably reduces availability.  
Elasticsearch has a similar failure [80], in which a partial partition leads to having two 
simultaneous leaders because nodes that can reach the two partitions become followers 
of the two leaders. The source of this failure is that nodes are allowed to vote for new 
leaders while it is still connected to a current leader. 
 Configuration change in RethinkDB and Hazelcast. RethinkDB is a strongly consistent 
database based on Raft [52]. Unlike Raft, when an admin removes a replica from 
RethinkDB cluster, the removed replica will delete its Raft log. This apparently minor 
tweak of the Raft protocol leads to a catastrophic failure. For instance, if a partial 
network partition breaks a replica set of five servers (A, B, C, D, and E) such that the 
(A, B) partition cannot reach (D, E) while C can reach all nodes, then if D receives a 
request to change the replication to two, D will remove A, B, and C from the set of 
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replicas. C will delete its log. A and B will be unaware of the configuration change and 
still think that C is an active replica. C, having lost its Raft log that contains the 
configuration change request, will respond to A and B requests. This scenario creates 
two replica sets for the same keys. D and E are a majority in the new configuration, and 
A, B, and C are a majority in the old configuration [72].  
Hazelcast has a similar failure [81]. In Hazelcast, nodes delete their local data on 
configuration change. If a partial partition separates the new primary replica, then one 
replica will promote itself to become the primary. If the central master can reach both 
partitions, it will see that the old primary is still alive and inform the self-promoted 
replica to step down. That replica will step down, delete its data, and try to download 
the data from the primary. If the primary permanently fails before the partition heals, 
the data will be lost [81]. 
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Chapter 5 
Failure Complexity 
To understand the complexity of these failures, we studied their manifestation sequence, 
importance of input events order, network fault characteristics, timing constraints, and system 
scale. The majority of the failures are deterministic, require three or fewer input events, and 
can be reproduced using only three nodes. These characteristics indicate that it is feasible to 
test for these failures using limited resource. 
5.1 Manifestation Sequence Analysis 
Finding 7. A majority (83%) of the failures triggered by a network partition require an 
additional three or fewer input events to manifest (Table 7). 
Table 7. The minimum number of events required to cause a failure. The table counts a 
network-partitioning fault as an event. Note that 12.5% of the failures require no client 
access, neither during a network partition nor before the partition occurs. Note that 28% of 
the failures reported in Table 5 do not require client access during the partition, but around 
15.5% require client access before the network partition occurs. 
Number of events % 
1 (just a network partition) 12.6% 
2 13.9% 
3 42.6% 
4 14.0% 
> 4 16.9% 
 
Table 8 lists the events that led to failures. All of the listed operations are frequently used. 
Read and write operations are part of over 50% of the failures, and 12.6% of the failures do 
not require any events other than a single network-partitioning fault. As an example of a failure 
without any client access, in Redis [82], if a network partition separates two nodes during a 
sync operation, the data log on the receiving node will be permanently corrupted. Similarly, in 
RabbitMQ [83], if a partial partition isolates one node from the leader, but not from the rest of 
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the replicas, that node will assume the leader has crashed. The isolated node will become the 
new leader. When the old leader receives a notification to become a follower, it will start a 
follower thread but will not stop the leader thread. The contention between the follower and 
leader threads results in a complete system hang. 
Table 8. Percentage of faults each event is involved in. 
Event type % 
Only a network-partitioning fault 12.6% 
Write request 48.5% 
Read request 34.6% 
Acquire lock 8.1% 
Admin adding/removing a node 8.0% 
Delete request 4.4% 
Release lock 3.7% 
Whole cluster reboot 1.5% 
 
This is perilous, as a small number of frequently used events can lead to catastrophic failures. 
All of the 87% of failures that require multiple events (2 events or more in Table 7) need the 
events to occur in a specific order. This implies that to expose these failures we not only need 
to explore the combination of these events, but also the different permutations of events, which 
makes the event space extremely large.  
Fortunately, the findings identified characteristics that significantly prune this large event 
space and make testing tractable (Table 9). First, 84% of the manifestation sequences start with 
a network-partitioning fault. For 27.7% of the sequences, the order of the rest of events is not 
important, and in 27% of the sequences the events follow a natural order; that is, lock() comes 
before unlock(), and write() before read(). 
Table 9. Ordering characteristics. 
Ordering Charactrisitcs % 
Network partition does not come first  16.0% 
Network partition comes first  
 Order is not important  
 Natural order 
 Other  
 
27.7% 
26.9% 
29.4% 
84.0% 
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While this finding indicates that reproducing a failure can be complex, the probability of a 
failure in production is still high. The majority of multi-event failures require three or fewer 
events (Table 7); consequently, it is highly likely for a system that experiences a network 
partitioning for hours to receive all possible permutations of these common events. 
Finding 9. The majority (88%) of the failures manifest by isolating a single node, with 45% 
of the failures manifest by isolating any replica. 
It is alarming that the majority of the failures can occur by isolating a single node. 
Conceivably, isolating a single node is more likely than other network-partitioning cases; it 
can happen because of an NIC failure, a single link failure, or a ToR switch failure. ToR switch 
failures are common in production networks leading to 40 network partitions in two years at 
Google [21] and 70% of the downtime at Microsoft [22]. This finding invalidates the common 
practice of assigning a low priority to ToR switch failures based on the presumption that data 
redundancy can effectively mask them [22]. The results of this study show that this practice 
aggravates the problem by prolonging the partition. 
This study further looked into the connectivity between replicas (Table 10) of the same 
object and found that 45% of failures manifest by isolating any replica, and the rest requires 
isolating a specific node or service (e.g., ZooKeeper cluster). Among the failures that isolate a 
specific node, isolating a leader replica (36%) and central services (8.8%) are the most 
common. This does not reduce the possibility of a failure because, as in many systems, every 
node is a leader for some data and is a secondary replica for other data. Consequently, isolating 
any replica in the cluster will most likely isolate a leader. 
This finding highlights the importance of testing these specific faults that isolate a leader, a 
central service, and nodes with special roles (e.g., scheduler, and MapReduce App Master). 
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Table 10. System connectivity during the network partition. Examples of a central service 
include a ZooKeeper cluster and HBase master. Examples of nodes with a special role include 
MongoDB arbiter and MapReduce AppMaster. 
Network Partition Characteristics % 
Partition any replica 44.9% 
Partition a specific node 
 Partition the leader 
 Partition a central service 
 Partition a node with a special role 
 Other (e.g., new node, source of data migration) 
 
36.0% 
8.8% 
3.7% 
6.6% 
55.1% 
 
5.2 Timing Constraints 
Finding 10. The majority (80%) of the failures are either deterministic or have known timing 
constraints. 
The majority of the failures (Table 11) are either deterministic (62%), meaning they will 
manifest given the input events, or have known timing constraints (18%). These known 
constraints are configurable or hard coded, such as the number of heartbeat periods to wait 
before declaring that a node has failed. 
Table 11. Timing constraints. 
Timing constraints % 
No timing constraints 61.8% 
Has timing constraints 
 Known 
 Unknown – but still can be tested 
 
18.4% 
12.8% 
31.2% 
Nondeterministic  7% 
 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the timing constraints immediately follow network-
partitioning faults. For instance, if a partition isolates a leader, for a failure to happen, events 
at the old leader side should be invoked right after the partition, so they are processed before 
the old leader steps down; while on the majority side, the test should sleep for a known period 
until a new leader is elected. For instance, in RabbitMQ, Redis, Hazelcast, and VoltDB, a 
  29 
failure will happen only if a write is issued before the old leader steps down (e.g., within three 
heartbeats) after a partitioning fault. 
The 13% of the failures that have unknown timing constraints manifest when the sequence 
of events overlaps with a system internal operation. For instance, in Cassandra, a failure [84] 
will only occur if a network partition takes place during a data sync operation between the 
handoff node and a replica. However, these failures can still be tested by well-designed unit 
tests. For instance, to test the aforementioned Cassandra failure, a test should (1) isolate a 
replica to make the system add a handoff node. (2) Write a large amount of data. (3) Heal the 
partition. Now, the handoff node will start syncing the data with the replica. Finally, (4) create 
a network partition that isolates the replica during the sync operation and triggers the failure. 
Only 7% of the failures are nondeterministic; these failures are caused by multithreaded 
interleavings and by overlapping the manifestation sequence with hard-to-predict internal 
system operations. 
This finding implies that testers should pay close attention to timing. However, the results 
indicate that timing constraints usually follow the partitioning fault, which considerably 
simplifies testing. 
5.3 Resolution Analysis 
Finding 11. The resolution of 47% of the failures required redesigning a system mechanism 
(Table 12). 
Table 12. Percentage of design and implementation flaws for failures reported in issue-
tracking systems. 
Category % Average Resolution Time 
Design 46.6% 205 days 
Implementation  32.2% 81 days 
Unresolved 21.2% - 
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The code patch is considered to be fixing a design flaw if it involves major changes to the 
affected mechanism logic, design, or protocol, such as implementing a new leader election 
protocol in MongoDB and changing configuration change protocols in Elasticsearch. 
The large percentage of the failures that led to changes in the mechanism design indicates 
that network-partitioning faults were not considered in the initial design phase. As a result, a 
design review focusing on network partitioning fault tolerance would have discovered systems 
vulnerability to these faults. 
Table 12 also reports the resolution time, which is the period from the time a developer 
acknowledges a failure to the time the issue is fixed. Obtaining an accurate resolution time is 
tricky. Outliers that take minutes to commit a complex patch or take over two years to add a 
simple patch were removed. In addition, it is not necessary for the time reported to be spent 
actively solving the issue. Nevertheless, because these are high-priority tickets, it is expected 
that the reported times give some indication of the resolution effort. Table 12 shows that design 
flaws take 2.5 times longer to resolve than implementation bugs. 
Some systems opted to change the system specification instead of fixing the issue. For 
instance, Redis documentation states that “there is always a window of time when it is possible 
to lose writes during partitions” [85]. RabbitMQ’s documentation was updated to indicate that 
locking does not tolerate network partitioning [86], and Hazelcast’s documentation [87] states 
that it provides “best effort consistency,” in which data updated through atomic operations may 
be lost. This could imply that some of the systems unnecessarily selected a strong consistency 
model where an eventual model was sufficient or the developers do not believe that these are 
high priority issues. 
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5.4 Opportunity for Improved Testing 
Finding 12. All failures can be reproduced on a cluster of five nodes, with the majority 
(83%) of the failures being reproducible with three nodes only (Table 13). 
Table 13. Number of nodes needed to reproduce a failure. 
Number of Nodes % 
3 nodes 83.1% 
5 nodes 16.9% 
 
This finding implies that it is not necessary to have a large cluster to test these systems. In 
fact, it is enough to test them using a single physical machine that runs five virtual machines. 
Finding 13. The majority of the failures (93%) can be reproduced through tests by using a 
fault injection framework such as NEAT. 
Considering the findings, perhaps it is not surprising that the majority of the failures can be 
reproduced using unit and system-level tests with a framework that can inject network-
partitioning faults. The majority of the failures result from a single network-partitioning fault, 
need fewer than three common input events, and are deterministic or have bounded timing 
constraints. The 7% that cannot be easily tested are nondeterministic failures or have short 
vulnerability intervals.  
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Chapter 6 
NEAT Framework 
We built the network partitioning testing framework (NEAT), a testing framework with 
network-partitioning fault injection. NEAT supports the three types of partitions, has a simple 
API for creating and healing partitions, and simplifies the coordination of events across clients. 
NEAT is implemented in 1553 lines of Java and uses OpenFlow and the iptables tool to 
inject network-partitioning faults. 
6.1 API 
NEAT is a generic testing framework. It does not have any constraints on the target system. 
To test a system, the developer should implement three classes. First is the ISystem interface, 
which provides methods to install, start, obtain the status of, and shut down the target system. 
Second, is a Client class that provides wrappers around the client API (e.g., put or get calls). 
Third is the test workload and verification code.  
Listing 1 presents a test for an Elasticsearch data loss failure [88] with partial network 
partitioning. The network partition (line 7) isolates s1 (the primary replica) and client 1 from 
s2 and client 2. However, all nodes can reach s3. s2 will detect that the primary replica (s1) is 
unreachable and start a leader election process. s3 will vote for s2, although it can reach s1, 
resulting in two leaders. Consequently, writes on both sides of the partition will succeed (line 
11 and 12). After healing the partition (line 13), s2 will detect that s1 is reachable. As in 
Elasticsearch, the replica with a smaller ID wins the election, so s2 will step down and become 
a follower of s1. s2 will replicate s1’s data and, consequently, all writes served by s2 during 
the partition will be lost and the check on line 16 will fail. 
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Listing 2 presents an ActiveMQ test for double dequeueing with complete network 
partitioning. The network partition (line 8) isolates the master and client1 from the rest of the 
cluster. The test then pops the queue at both sides of the partition (lines 11-13). If the two sides 
obtain the same value, then the same value was dequeued twice and the test fails. 
Listing 1. An Elasticsearch test for data loss. The system has three servers: s1 (primary node), 
s2, and s3, and two clients. 
1 public static void testDataLoss(){ 
2  List<Node> side1 = asList(s1, client1); 
3  // other servers and clients in one group 
4  List<Node> side2 = asList(s2, client2); 
5  // create a partial partition. s3 can reach 
6  // all nodes 
7  Partition netPart = Partitioner.partial(side1, side2); 
8  sleep(SLEEP_LEADER_ELECTION_PERIOD); 
9  // write to both sides of the partition 
10 assertTrue(client1.write(obj1, v1)); 
11 assertTrue(client2.write(obj2, v2)); 
12 Partitioner.heal(netPart); 
13 // verify the two objects 
14 assertEquals(client2.read(obj1), v1); 
15 assertEquals(client2.read(obj2), v2);    } 
 
Listing 2. An ActiveMQ test for a double dequeue failure. The system has three servers and 
two clients. 
1 public static void testDoubleDequeueu(){ 
2  assertTrue(client1.send(q1, msg1)); 
3  assertTrue(client1.send(q1, msg2)); 
4  // get the master node 
5  Node master = AMQSys.getMaster(q1); 
6  List<Node> minority= asList(master, client1); 
7  List<Node>majority=Partitioner.rest(minority); 
8  Partition netPart = Partitioner.complete(minority, majority); 
9  // dequeue at both sides of the partition  
10 Msg minMsg = client1.receive(q1); 
11 sleep(SLEEP_PERIOD); 
12 Msg majMsg = client2.receive(q1); 
13 assertNotEqual(minMsg, majMsg);     } 
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6.2 Creating and Healing Network Partitions 
To create or heal a network partition, the developer calls one of the following methods.  
 Partition complete(List<Node> groupA, List<Node> groupB): 
creates a complete partition between groupA and groupB. 
 Partition partial(List<Node> groupA, List<Node> groupB): 
creates a partition between groupA and groupB without effecting their communication 
with the rest of the cluster. 
 Partition simplex(List<Node> groupSrc, List<Node> 
groupDst): creates a simplex partition such that packets can only flow from 
groupSrc to groupDst, but not in the other direction.  
 void heal(Partition p): heals partition p. 
6.3 NEAT Design 
NEAT has three components (Figure 2): server nodes, which run the target system; client 
nodes, which issue client requests; and a test engine. The test engine is a central node that runs 
the test workload (e.g., Listing 1). 
The test engine simplifies testing by providing a global order for all client operations. The 
test engine invokes all client operations using Java RMI. The current NEAT prototype has two 
implementations of the network partitioner module: using OpenFlow and using the iptables 
tool. Furthermore, the test engine provides an API for crashing any group of nodes. 
The OpenFlow-based partitioner is a network controller [35] that first installs the rules for a 
basic learning switch [89]. Then it installs partitioning rules to drop packets from a specific set 
of source IP addresses to a specific set of destination addresses. The partitioning rules are 
installed at a higher priority than the learning switch rules. The partitioner is implemented in 
152 lines of code using Floodlight [90]. 
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Figure 4. NEAT architecture. 
 
Our choice to use SDN to build a testing framework for distributed systems is research based. 
Connecting the nodes to a single switch and having the ability to monitor and control every 
packet in the system is a powerful capability for distributed systems testing. The first attempt 
to explore this capability is to build a network partitioner for NEAT. Our current research effort 
explores techniques to collect detailed system traces under different failure scenarios and build 
tools to verify and visualize system protocols. This will help developers test, debug, and inspect 
protocols under different failure scenarios.  
For deployments that do not have an OpenFlow switch, the partitioner was implemented 
using the iptables tool to modify the firewall configuration on every node to create the 
specified partitions. 
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6.4 Testing Systems with NEAT 
NEAT was used to test seven systems: Ceph [37] (v12.2.5), an object storage system; Apache 
Ignite [39] (v2.4.0), a key-value store and distributed data structures; Terracotta [40] (v4.3.4), 
a suite of distributed data structures; DKron [41] (v0.9.8), a job scheduling system; ActiveMQ 
[38] (v5.15.3), a message-queueing system; Infinispan [42] (v9.2.1), a key-value store; and 
MooseFS [43] (v3), a file system. All systems were configured with the most reliable 
configuration. For instance, when possible the system was configured to persist data on disk, 
use synchronous replication, and set the minimum replication per operation to equal the 
majority or the number of all replicas.  
Testing setup. Two testbeds were used to run experiments: CloudLab [91] and our own 
cluster. Six nodes were used in the tests. The nodes were connected by a single switch. One 
node ran the test engine, three nodes ran the system, and two nodes acted as clients.  
The tests involved creating a network partition, then issuing client requests to the two sides 
of the partition, followed by performing a verification step. On average, tests are implemented 
in 30 lines of Java code. For each system we tested, we followed our findings to design test 
scenarios for various user APIs provided by the system. However, we did not perform a 
comprehensive test against network partitioning, and the failures we report are not inclusive of 
all network-partitioning failures that may exist in these systems. Our data set contains detailed 
information about how each test case was performed.    
Table 14 summarizes the testing results. This testing revealed 32 network-partitioning 
failures, out of which 30 are catastrophic. The detected failures lead to data loss, stale reads, 
data unavailability, double locking, and lock corruption. It is plausible that a single design flaw 
or implementation bug (e.g., flawed replication protocol) may cause failures in different 
operations (e.g., adding to a list and pushing to a queue). These failures are counted as separate 
failures. 
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To demonstrate the versatility of NEAT, the following discusses failures that NEAT 
discovered. 
Examples of complete network partition failures: All Ignite atomic synchronization 
primitives, including semaphores, compare_and_set, increment_and_get, and 
decrement_and_get, are violated or corrupted when a complete network partition isolates one 
of the replicas. The main culprit of such failures is the assumption that an unreachable node 
has crashed; consequently, nodes on both sides of a partition remove the nodes they cannot 
reach (i.e., the nodes on the other side of the partition) from their replica set.  Figure 5 shows 
a semaphore double locking failure in Apache Ignite. If a complete network partition isolates 
one of the replica (Figure 5 Step 1), clients connected to both sides of the partition will be able 
to acquire the same semaphore resulting double locking failure (Figure 5 Step 2). Also in 
Apache Ignite, an unreachable client that is holding a semaphore is assumed to have crashed. 
In this case, the system will reclaim the client’s semaphore. If the partition heals and the client 
signals the semaphore, the semaphore will be corrupted. These failures lead to lasting damage 
that persists after the partition heals. 
 
Figure 5. Semaphore double locking failure 
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Examples of partial network partition failures: ActiveMQ uses ZooKeeper to keep track of 
the current leader. As shown in Figure 5, when a partial network partition isolates the leader 
from the replicas, but not from ZooKeeper, the system will hang. The leader will not be able 
to forward messages to replicas and the replicas will not elect a new leader as ZooKeeper does 
not see the failure. 
 
Figure 6. System unavailability failure in ActiveMQ 
 
In DKron, if a partial partition separates the leader from the rest of DKron’s nodes—but not 
from the central data store service—then the client requests processed by the leader will be 
successfully executed at the local level. However, DKron will indicate that the task has failed. 
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Chapter 7 
Additional Related Work 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first in-depth study of the manifestation sequence of 
network-partitioning failures. The manual analysis allowed detailed examination of the 
sequence of events, identified common vulnerabilities, and found failure characteristics that 
can improve testing. 
A large body of previous work analyzed failures in distributed systems. A subset of these 
efforts focused on specific component failures such as physical [92] and virtual machines [93], 
network devices [22, 24], storage systems [94, 95], software bugs [96], and job failures [97, 
98, 99]. Another set characterized a broader set of failures, but only for specific domain of 
systems and services, such as HPC [100, 101, 102], IaaS clouds [103], data-mining services 
[104], hosting services [6, 105], and data-intensive systems [97, 96, 106]. This work 
complements these efforts by focusing on failures triggered by network partitioning. 
Yuan et al. [66] studied 198 randomly selected failures from six data analytics systems. This 
study indicated that a higher percentage of network-partitioning failures (80%) lead to 
catastrophic effects, compared to 24% reported by Yuan et al. [66]; and while 26% of general 
failures are nondeterministic, only 7% of network-partitioning failures are non-deterministic. 
These findings indicate that network-partitioning failures are more critical than general system 
failures, and testers need to pay close attention to timing.  
Jepsen’s blog posts report network-partitioning failures that were found using the Jepsen 
tool [54]. However, they do not detail the manifestation sequences, correlate failures across 
systems, study the impact of different types of network-partitioning faults, study client access 
requirements, characterize network faults, or analyze timing constraints. 
Majumdar et al. [107] theoretically analyzed the space for faulty executions in the presence 
of complete network partitioning faults. They discussed the extreme size of the test space and 
  40 
the effectiveness of random testing if tests isolate a specific node, place a leader in a minority, 
and test with a random order of short sequences of operations. 
While this work identifies characteristics to improve testing, the findings can inform other 
fault tolerance techniques. Previous efforts explored model checking [108, 109, 110, 111, 112], 
systematic fault injection [113, 114], and runtime verification techniques [115, 116] for 
improving systems’ fault tolerance. The findings inform these techniques to consider all types 
of network partitions and discovered characteristics that can improve these techniques’ time 
and efficiency. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We conducted a comprehensive study of network-partitioning failures in modern cloud 
systems. It is surprising that these production systems experience silent catastrophic failures 
due to a frequently occurring infrastructure fault, when a single node is isolated, and under 
simple and common workloads. The findings identified that improvements to the software 
development process and testing can significantly improve systems’ resilience to network 
partitions. These findings indicate that this is a high-impact research area that needs further 
effort to improve system design, engineering, testing, and fault tolerance. We built NEAT, a 
testing framework that can inject different types of network-partitioning faults. NEAT was 
used to test seven systems and 32 failures were found, which is encouraging; even this 
preliminary testing tool found bugs in production systems, indicating that there is a large room 
for improvement. 
Overlooking network-partitioning faults. The studied failures suggest that designers did not 
consider the possibility of network partitioning. For example, Redis promises data reliability 
even though it uses asynchronous replication, leading to data loss [117]. Similarly, the 
Hazelcast locking service relies on asynchronous replication, leading to double locking [118]. 
Earlier versions of Aerospike assumed that the network is reliable [119]. Also, implicit 
assumptions in the studied systems which are untrue. For instance, tickets from MapReduce, 
RabbitMQ, Ignite, and HBase indicate that the developer assumed an unreachable node to have 
halted, which is not true with network partitioning, as complete network partitions can isolate 
healthy nodes that lead to both sides assuming that the other side has crashed. Finally, all partial 
network-partitioning failures are caused by an implicit assumption that if a node can reach a 
service, then all nodes can reach that service. Hence, further research is needed for building 
more accurate node-failure detectors and fault tolerance techniques. 
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Lack of adequate testing tools. In general, systems lack rigorous testing for network-
partitioning. For unit tests related to the code patches to the studied failures, the developers 
typically used mocking techniques to test the impact of network partitioning on one component 
on one side of the partition. Which indicate that the community lacks a network-partitioning 
fault injection tool that can be integrated with the current testing frameworks. 
Partial network partitions. Another interesting area of research that this analysis identified 
is partial network partitions fault tolerance. It is surprising that many failures in production 
systems are triggered by this fault, yet we could not find any discussion, failure model, or fault 
tolerance techniques that address this type of failure. 
Simplify testing. While better testing is one approach for improving system fault tolerance, 
the findings highlighted that the number of test cases one needs to consider is excessive. 
Luckily, this study found operations, timing, ordering, and network failure characteristics that 
limit the testing space. 
Debunk common presumptions. This analysis highlights that the current network 
maintenance practice of assigning a low priority to ToR switch failure is ill founded and 
aggravates the problem. Finally, the findings highlight that system designers need to pay 
careful attention to internal and offline operations, need be wary of tweaking established 
protocols, and need to consider network partitioning failures early in their design process. 
8.1 Future Work 
Our current work focuses on two directions. First, extending NEAT to automatically 
generate application workload and inject different types of network partitions to cover the huge 
space of failure scenarios. Also, the tool will help in inspecting and visualizing complex 
distributed protocols by collecting detailed system traces of failures. Second, we will explore 
building fault tolerance mechanisms for all types of network partitions, especially partial 
network partitions. The data set and the source code are available at: 
https://dsl.uwaterloo.ca/projects/neat  
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Appendix A. 
Summary of Failures extracted from the issue-
tracking systems 
Table 14. Summary of the studied failures from the issue-tracking systems. The timing 
constraints column indicates any timing constraints of the failure. “Deterministic” means that 
the failure has no timing constraints. “Fixed” means the timing constraints is hard coded or 
configurable such as leader timeout. “Bounded” means that the network partitions should 
overlap with internal system operation, such as data migration. “Unknown” means that timing 
constraints is not defined such as interleaving of threads.   
System Reference Impact Partitions 
type 
Timing 
constraints 
MongoDB [120] Data loss Complete Fixed 
MongoDB [65] Dirty read Complete Fixed 
MongoDB [65] Stale read Complete Fixed 
MongoDB [121] Data loss Complete Fixed 
MongoDB [122] Data loss Partial Fixed 
MongoDB [122] Stale read Partial Fixed 
MongoDB [123] Performance degradation Partial Fixed 
MongoDB [124] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
MongoDB [125] Data loss Partial Fixed 
MongoDB [125] Stale read Partial Fixed 
MongoDB [126] Stale read Complete Fixed 
MongoDB [127] Data loss Complete Unknown 
MongoDB [127] Stale read Complete Unknown 
MongoDB [128] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
MongoDB [129] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
MongoDB [130] System crash/hang Complete Bounded 
MongoDB [68] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
MongoDB [131] Data loss Simplex Deterministic 
MongoDB [73] System crash/hang Complete Deterministic 
VoltDB [132] Data loss Complete Fixed 
VoltDB [133] Data loss Complete Fixed 
VoltDB [70] Dirty read Complete Fixed 
VoltDB [70] Stale read Complete Fixed 
RethinkDB [72] Data loss Complete Bounded 
RethinkDB [72] Dirty read Complete Bounded 
  44 
RethinkDB [72] Stale read Complete Bounded 
HBase [76] Data loss Partial Unknown 
HBase [134] Performance degradation Partial Bounded 
HBase [135] Data unavailability Partial Deterministic 
HBase [136] Data unavailability Complete Unknown 
HBase [137] System crash/hang Complete Deterministic 
Riak  [67] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Cassandra [138] Stale read Complete Deterministic 
Cassandra [138] Data unavailability Complete Deterministic 
Cassandra [139] Data loss Complete Bounded  
Cassandra [84] System crash/hang Complete Bounded 
Aerospike [140] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Aerospike [140] Stale read Complete Deterministic 
Aerospike [140] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Deterministic 
Geode [141] Data unavailability Complete Deterministic 
Geode [142] Stale read Complete Unknown 
Redis [82] Data corruption Complete Bounded 
Redis [143] System crash/hang Complete Deterministic 
Redis [144] Data loss Complete Fixed 
Hazelcast [145] Data loss Complete Fixed 
Hazelcast [81] Data loss Complete Bounded 
Hazelcast [146] Data loss Complete Bounded 
Hazelcast [147] Performance degradation Complete Bounded 
Hazelcast [148] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
Hazelcast [118] Data loss Complete Fixed 
Hazelcast [118] Broken locks Complete Fixed 
ZooKeeper [149] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Deterministic 
ZooKeeper [150] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Deterministic 
ZooKeeper [74] Data corruption Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [151] Stale read Complete Fixed 
Elasticsearch [151] Data loss Complete Fixed 
Elasticsearch [152] Dirty read Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [153] Stale read Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [153] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [154] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [155] Stale read Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [155] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
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Elasticsearch [156] Stale read Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [156] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [80] Stale read Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [80] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [75] Data corruption Complete Bounded 
Elasticsearch [157] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [158] Performance degradation Complete Bounded 
Elasticsearch [159] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [160] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [161] Stale read Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [161] Data loss Partial Deterministic 
Elasticsearch [161] Stale read Complete Bounded 
Elasticsearch [161] Data loss Complete Bounded 
Elasticsearch [161] Dirty read Complete Fixed 
HDFS [162] Data corruption Partial Deterministic 
HDFS [163] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
HDFS [164] Performance degradation Simplex Bounded 
HDFS [79] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
Kafka  [165] System crash/hang Complete Deterministic 
Kafka  [166] Data unavailability Complete Deterministic 
Kafka  [167] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
Kafka  [168] System crash/hang Partial Deterministic 
Kafka  [169] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [69] Data loss Complete Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [170] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [171] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [83] System crash/hang Partial Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [172] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [173] Broken locks Complete Deterministic 
RabbitMQ [173] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Deterministic 
MapReduce  [174] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
MapReduce  [175] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
MapReduce  [176] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
MapReduce  [177] Data corruption Partial Deterministic 
MapReduce  [78] Data corruption Partial Deterministic 
MapReduce  [178] Performance degradation Complete Bounded 
Chronos [179] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
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Chronos [179] System crash/hang Complete Deterministic 
Mesos  [180] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
Mesos  [181] Performance degradation Partial Deterministic 
Mesos  [182] Performance degradation Complete Deterministic 
Mesos  [183] Performance degradation Simplex Deterministic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47 
Appendix B. 
Summary of Failures discovered by 
NEAT 
Table 15. Summary of the failures discovered by NEAT. Status with “-----” means that the 
ticket is still open and no response is received from the developers of the system. 
System Reference Impact Partitions type Status 
Ceph [184] Data loss Partial Confirmed 
Ceph [184] Data corruption Partial Confirmed 
ActiveMQ [185] System hang Partial Confirmed 
ActiveMQ [186] Double dequeueing Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [187] Stale read Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [188] broken locks Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [189] Data loss Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [190] Data loss Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [190] Data loss Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [190] Data loss Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [191] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [191] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Confirmed 
Terracotta [191] Reappearance of deleted data Complete Confirmed 
Ignite [192] Cache - Stale read Complete ------ 
Ignite [193] Queue - Data unavailability Complete ------ 
Ignite [192] Cache - Data unavailability Complete ------ 
Ignite [193] Double dequeueing Complete ------ 
Ignite [194] Data unavailability Complete ------ 
Ignite [195] Broken AtomicSequence Complete ------ 
Ignite [195] Broken AtomicLong Complete ------ 
Ignite [195] Broken AtomicRef Complete ------ 
Ignite [195] Broken counters Complete ------ 
Ignite [195] Data loss Complete ------ 
Ignite [196] Broken locks Complete ------ 
Ignite [197] Broken locks Complete ------ 
Ignite [198] Broken locks Complete ------ 
Ignite [199] System hang Complete ------ 
Ignite [200] Broken status API Complete ------ 
Infinispan [201] Dirty read Complete ------ 
Dkron [202] Data corruption Partial Confirmed 
MooseFS [203] Data unavailability Partial ------ 
MooseFS [204] System hang Partial ------ 
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